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Abstract
In order to improve aviation security, many airports apply Threat Image Projection (TIP) and
computer-based X-ray image interpretation training (CBT). One difference between TIP and CBT X-ray
images is the algorithm used to merge virtual threat items into X-ray images of passenger bags, resulting
in different color nuances. In this study, we tested the influence of merging algorithms on threat object
detection performance, reaction time and confidence rating of 12 airport security screeners. The image
merging algorithms of the individually adaptive CBT X-Ray Tutor were used. We have found that the
hit rate was higher for TIP images compared to CBT images. Accordingly, the mean of confidence
ratings was increased for TIP images. The reaction times tended to be shorter for TIP images. The
results of our study indicate that the CBT merging algorithm used in this study is more realistic than the
tested TIP image merging algorithm.
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Abstract— In order to improve aviation security, many airports 
apply Threat Image Projection (TIP) and computer-based X-ray 
image interpretation training (CBT). One difference between TIP 
and CBT X-ray images is the algorithm used to merge virtual 
threat items into X-ray images of passenger bags, resulting in 
different color nuances. In this study, we tested the influence of 
merging algorithms on threat object detection performance, 
reaction time and confidence rating of 12 airport security 
screeners. The image merging algorithms of the individually 
adaptive CBT X-Ray Tutor were used. We have found that the 
hit rate was higher for TIP images compared to CBT images. 
Accordingly, the mean of confidence ratings was increased for 
TIP images. The reaction times tended to be shorter for TIP 
images. The results of our study indicate that the CBT merging 
algorithm used in this study is more realistic than the tested TIP 
image merging algorithm. 
Keywords- aviation security, display technologies, human-
machine interaction, object recognition, image merging algorithms 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In aviation security, one main focus is the improvement of 
the process of X-ray screening of passenger bags in order to 
prevent forbidden objects getting past the security checkpoint. 
Although many airports are equipped with technologies of the 
newest generation, the detection of threat objects relies 
ultimately on human operators (airport security screeners), who 
visually inspect the X-ray images and decide whether a bag 
contains a threat object or not.  
The performance of airport security screeners in the task of 
X-ray image interpretation is influenced by knowledge-based 
and image-based factors [1]; [2].  
Knowledge-based factors refer to knowing which items are 
prohibited and what they look like in X-ray images of 
passenger bags. Some objects look quite different in X-ray 
images than in reality. Others, such as Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IED), are rarely seen in everyday life as well as at the 
security checkpoint and are therefore, difficult to recognize 
without the appropriate training.  
According to [3], there are three image-based factors: 
rotation of the threat item, superposition by other objects, and 
bag complexity. Several studies have shown that the rotation of 
an object can have a strong impact on recognition (e.g., [4]; [5]; 
[6]; [7]). In general, X-ray images of forbidden objects are 
difficult to recognize when depicted from an unusual viewpoint 
and when diagnostic features are not visible. Another important 
factor contributing to image difficulty is the superposition of 
the threat object by other objects in a bag. For example, if a 
knife is superimposed by high density material, it becomes 
more difficult to recognize the characteristic shape of the 
object. Furthermore, the complexity of a bag, determined by 
the number and type of objects in the bag, has a significant 
influence on the detection performance.  
Many airports approach the limiting factors described 
above with supportive measures like specific computer-based 
X-ray screening training (CBT) and Threat Image Projection 
(TIP). 
It has been shown that CBT can substantially increase X-
ray image interpretation competency and decrease reaction 
times [8]; [9]; [10]; [11]; [12]. Such training affects mainly 
knowledge-based factors and the detection of rotated objects 
[13]. Through training, airport’s security screeners learn which 
Figure 1.  Illustration of (a) a fictional threat item (FTI), (b) the position 
of a passenger bag where the FTI shall be inserted into, and (c) the 
resulting image which is shown to a security officer (screener) who 
decides whether the bag is OK or NOT OK.  
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objects are prohibited and what they look like in X-ray images. 
The screeners also store different and often unfamiliar views of 
the objects in visual memory [11]. 
TIP is a software function of current x-ray machines. Using 
this technology, fictional threat items (FTIs) are projected into 
X-ray images of real passenger bags during the routine airport 
security checks (see Fig. 1 for an illustration). The security 
officer (screener) has to identify the potential threat and press a 
button. Screener responses are recorded and the system 
provides an immediate feedback. TIP has been developed with 
the aim to counter the typical human factor problems in 
traditional X-ray screening of passenger bags: low occurrence 
of threats, low interactivity of the screening task, and the 
difficulty of online performance measurement [14]. TIP 
became an important tool for enhancing the attention and 
vigilance of airport security screeners.  
We have become aware that airport security screeners 
sometime state that they perceive TIP events as very easy due 
to non-authentic colors, unrealistic positions of the threat object 
within the bag, or an unrealistic threat item in a bag (e.g. a rifle 
in a small handbag), whereas they find CBT rather challenging. 
Consistent with these observations [15] found a ceiling effect, 
small inter-individual differences, and poor reliability for TIP 
data. TIP and CBT apply different algorithms for merging (or 
blending) FTIs into X-ray images of real passenger bags. Fig. 2 
illustrates the different color nuances in an original X-ray 
image (Fig. 2a), a TIP image (Fig. 2b), and a CBT image (Fig. 
2c).  
Previous research has shown that in visual search tasks, a 
target in a unique color pops out from a display and guides the 
attention to this target [16]; [17]; [18]; [19]. Furthermore, [20] 
have shown that the larger the difference between target and 
distracters, the more efficient the search. This “pop-out” 
phenomenon has been attributed to a parallel-processing, pre-
attentive mechanism that extracts unique perceptual features 
from cluttered visual scenes [21]; [22]. 
The goal of our study is to scrutinize whether the merging 
algorithm has an impact on the threat object detection 
performance of airport security screeners. We hypothesize that 
the color compositions created by the TIP merging algorithm 
lead to an increase of detection performance and confidence 
ratings for TIP images in comparison to CBT images, whereas 
the reaction times should be shorter for TIP images as for CBT 
images. Additionally, we expect reduced reaction times for the 
TIP images as a result of a pop-out effect due to unrealistic 
color compositions created by the TIP merging algorithm. 
II. METHOD 
A. Participants 
We recruited 12 airport security screeners (3 males) with at 
least three years on-the-job experience at a big European 
airport. Screeners were tested previously with X-ray image 
interpretation test and achieved a high detection performance 
(i.e., A’ > .90, and hit rate > .80) in the X-ray Competency 
Assessment Test (CAT, for details see [23]), as well as in the 
Bomb Detection Test (BDT, for details see [24]). Additionally, 
the recruited airport security screeners had to meet our criteria 
of a high on-the-job performance in 2007 recorded by the TIP 
system (i.e., A’ > .90, hit rate > .85, and false-alarm rate < .15). 
A’ is a “nonparametric” detection performance measure, which 
takes the hit rate as well as the false-alarm rate into account  
[25]; [26]. 
The age of the participants ranged from 26 to 55 (M = 
45.00 years, SD = 8.79 years). They were all naïve with regard 
to the hypotheses under investigation. 
B. Material 
The performance test consisted of X-ray images of bags, 
which were cabin baggage captured with X-ray machines at a 
European airport using the auto-archive function. These images 
were revised by three airport security supervisors in order to 
remove inappropriate images (e.g., images containing 
prohibited items or liquids). We used 512 of these bags with a 
high bag complexity, calculated by using the formula for 
opacity displayed in (1) as described by [27]. 
  (1) 
The formula reflects the extent to which X-rays are able to 
penetrate objects in a bag. IN (x,y) denotes the pixel intensities, 
whereas 64 is the pixel intensity threshold beneath which the 
pixels are counted. BS is the size of the bag and is used to 
standardize the Opacity value on bag size. 
Each bag was used twice, once combined with a prohibited 
item, and once without any threat object. The threat objects 
belong to four categories of prohibited items: guns, knives, 
 
Figure 2.  Illustration of color differences between (a) an original X-ray image, (b) a CTI created with the TIP merging algorithm, and (c) a CTI created with 
the CBT merging algorithm. 
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Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), and other prohibited 
items (e.g., gas, chemicals, or grenades). The threat objects 
have been captured by experts of Zurich State Police, Airport 
division.  
We used 16 exemplars of each category and combined 
every item with two different bags, in a manner that the degree 
of superposition by other objects was high. For this purpose we 
used the formula for superposition depicted in (2) [27]. 
   (2) 
The function computes the difference between the pixel 
intensity values of the bag image with the threat object (ISN(x, 
y)) and the pixel intensities of the corresponding harmless bag 
(IN(x, y)). 
Furthermore, each threat item was presented in two 
different rotations. The easy rotation shows the object from a 
canonical perspective [28] as judged by two security experts 
who captured the stimuli. The difficult rotation shows the threat 
item rotated horizontally or vertically by 85 degrees relative to 
the canonical view. 
Each of these combined threat images was once created by 
using the TIP merging algorithm, and once by using the CBT 
merging algorithm. Hence, the images were identical, with the 
exception that we varied the merging algorithm (see Fig. 3).  
Overall, the experiment comprised 1024 trials: 16 (threat 
objects) * 4 (categories) * 2 (rotation) * 2 (bag with/without 
threat item) * 2 (each threat object combined with two bags) * 
2 (CBT or TIP merging algorithm). 
C. Procedure 
After two practice trials, half of the participants started with 
the CBT condition, the other half with the TIP condition. Each 
trial was presented for 15 seconds. Participants had to decide 
whether the presented bag was OK (contains no threat item) or 
NOT OK (contains a threat item) by clicking the respective 
button on the screen. Participants were instructed to answer as 
fast and as accurately as possible. Additionally, they were 
asked to indicate how confident they were in their decision by 
clicking on a slider on the screen. The 1024 trials have been 
subdivided into four blocks. Participants were allowed to take a 
short break after completing each block. Trials were 
randomized within each block. Completing the experiment 
took about 90 minutes. 
III. RESULTS 
A. Analysis of hit and false-alarm rates 
In order to examine the effect of the merging algorithm on 
the detection performance, we analyzed hit and false-alarm 
rates. The hit rate refers to the proportion of all images 
containing a prohibited item that have been judged as NOT 
OK, while the false-alarm rate refers to the proportion of NOT 
OK judgments for harmless bags. There was a significant 
increase of the hit rate for the TIP merging algorithm in 
comparison to the CBT merging algorithm, t(11) = -29.65 , p < 
.001, with a large effect size of d = 1.67, while the false-alarm 
rate remained the same, t(11) = -0.19, p = .43, d = 0.02 (see 
Fig. 4).  
 
 
Next, we ran a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) for 
repeated measures using the hit rate with the within-participant 
factors merging algorithm (TIP, CBT) and category (guns, 
knives, IED, and other threat objects) in order to compare the 
 
Figure 3.   (a) A CBT trial containing a gun in an easy rotation and (b) the corresponding TIP trial. 
Figure 4.  Effect of the merging algorithm on the hit and false-alarm rate. 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean (SEM). Note that 
absolute performance values are not reported due to security reasons. 
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effect of the merging algorithm on the detection performance 
regarding the different threat object categories. We found a 
large main effect of the merging algorithm, F(1, 11) = 878.83, 
p < .001, η2 = .99, as well as of the category, F(3, 33) = 231.61, 
p < .001, η2 = .96. The interaction between merging algorithm 
and category was also significant, F(3, 33) = 10.30, p < .001, 
with a large effect size of η2 = .48. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed a significant increase of detection performance for 
guns t(11) = -19.08, p < .001, d = 1.60, knives, t(11) = -15.91, p 
< .001, d = 1.71, IED, t(11) = -13.12, p < .001, d = 1.59, and 
other threat objects, t(11) = -20.64, p < .001, d = 1.60. 
According to [29], all these effect sizes are large (see Fig. 5). 
 
B. Analysis of reaction times 
The effect of the merging algorithm on the reaction time 
pooled across all categories was marginally significant, t(11) = 
1.74, p = .06, with a medium effect size d = 0.56 [29]. Fig. 6 
shows the tendency of a prolonged reaction time for threat 
images produced with the CBT merging algorithm. A two-way 
ANOVA for repeated measures using the reaction time with the 
within-participant factors merging algorithm (TIP, CBT) and 
category (guns, knives, IED, and other threat objects) revealed 
no effect of the merging algorithm, F(1, 11) = 3.02, p = .11, η2 
= .22, but for category, Greenhouse-Geisser F(1.43, 15.68) = 
23.52, p < .001, η2 = .68. The interaction between merging 
algorithm and category was also not significant, Greenhouse-
Geisser F(1.59, 17.40) = 2.26, p = .14, η2 = .17. Pairwise 
comparisons disclosed that the difference in the reaction time 
was only significant for the category IED, t(11) = -13.12, p < 
.01, d = 0.98. For all other categories, the merging algorithm 
had no significant influence (guns, t(11) = 0.81, p = .22, d = 
0.25, knives, t(11) = 1.49, p = .08, d = 0.52, and other threat 
objects, t(11) = 1.29, p = .11, d = 0.47). Although the effects 
did not meet the level of significance, the effect sizes are at 
least small (guns and other threat objects) or medium (knives) 
according to [29].  
C. Analysis of confidence ratings 
Last, we analyzed the confidence ratings. Pooled across all 
categories, the mean of confidence ratings was higher for TIP 
images, t(11) = -3.28, p < .01, d = 0.48 (see Fig. 7). A two-way 
ANOVA for repeated measures using the mean of confidence 
ratings with the within-participant factors merging algorithm 
(TIP, CBT) and category (guns, knives, IED, and other threat 
objects) revealed a large main effect of the merging algorithm, 
F(1, 11) = 10.73, p < .01, η2 = .49, as well as of the category, 
Greenhouse-Geisser F(1.28, 14.04) = 4.67, p < .05, η2 = .30. 
The interaction between merging algorithm and category was 
also significant, F(3, 33) = 4.80, p < .01, η2 = .30. Pairwise 
comparisons disclosed a significant increase of perceived 
confidence for guns, t(11) = -1.88, p < .05, d = 0.32, knives, 
t(11) = -4.61, p < .001, d = 0.66, IED, t(11) = -3.57, p < .01, d 
= 0.49, and other threat objects, t(11) = -2.54, p < .05, d = 0.40.  
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The goal of our study was to examine whether there are 
differences between merging algorithms of TIP and CBT 
which would impact detection performance, reaction time and 
experienced confidence in X-ray image interpretation. 
Consistent with our first hypothesis, it was revealed that the 
hit rate is higher when CTIs were created using the TIP 
merging algorithm compared to CTIs created with the CBT 
merging algorithm. This effect was found for all threat object 
categories (guns, knives, IED, and other prohibited items). 
Figure 5.  Effect of the merging algorithm on the threat object category. 
Note that absolute performance values are not reported due to security 
reasons. 
 
Figure 6.  Effect of the merging algorithm on the reaction time pooled 
across all categories and for each category. Error bars represent standard 
errors of the mean (SEM). 
Figure 7.  Effect of the merging algorithm on the confidence ratings 
pooled across all categories and for each category. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean (SEM). 
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Consistent with [20] and our second hypothesis, reaction 
times were longer for CBT images in comparison to TIP 
images (although this effect was only marginally significant). 
The effect meets the level of significance for the category IED 
with a large effect size, whereas the effect sizes for the other 
categories are, apart from not being significant, at least small or 
medium. A larger sample size might lead to significant 
differences.  
The increase of experienced confidence for TIP CTI 
confirms our third hypothesis pooled across all conditions as 
well as for each category.  
These findings are consistent with the results of [15], which 
showed a ceiling-effect, small inter-individual differences and 
poor reliability of TIP data. Additionally, the reduced reaction 
times for TIP images indicate that the increased detection 
performance might in fact be mediated through unique color 
artifacts created by the TIP merging algorithm.  
Overall, our study provides evidence that the merging 
algorithm influences the detection performance of professional 
airport security screeners. Furthermore, we demonstrated that 
the CBT merging algorithm used in this study is more realistic 
than the TIP merging algorithm and therefore lays the better 
foundation for an effective training of airport security 
screeners. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
We are very thankful to Zurich State Police, Airport 
Division for their help in creating the stimuli and the good 
collaboration for conducting the study. We also thank Anton 
Bolfing for his valuable help with the image analyses.  
REFERENCES 
[1] D. Hardmeier, F. Hofer, and A. Schwaninger, “The X-ray object 
recognition test (X-ray ORT) – a reliable and valid instrument for 
measuring visual abilities needed in X-ray screening,” IEEE ICCST 
Proceedings, vol. 39, 2005, pp. 189-192. 
[2] A. Schwaninger, D. Hardmeier, and F. Hofer, “Measuring visual 
abilities and visual knowledge of aviation security screeners,” IEEE 
ICCST Proceedings, vol. 38, 2004, pp. 258-264. 
[3] A. Schwaninger, “Evaluation and selection of airport security 
screeners”, AIRPORT, 02/2003, pp. 14-15.  
[4] H. H. Bülthoff and S. Edelman, “Psychophysical support for a 2-D view 
interpolation theory of object recognition,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 89, 1992, pp. 
60-64. 
[5] M. Graf, A. Schwaninger, C. Wallraven, and H. H. Bülthoff, 
“Psychophysical results from experiments on recognition & 
categorization,” Information Society Technologies (IST) programme, 
Cognitive Vision Systems – CogVis (IST-2000-29375), 2002.  
[6] M. J. Tarr and H. H. Bülthoff, “Is human object recognition better 
described by geon structural description or by multiple views? Comment 
on Biederman and Gerhardstein (1993),” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, vol. 21, 1995, pp. 
1494-1505.  
[7] M. J. Tarr and H. H. Bülthoff, “Image-based object recognition in man, 
monkey and machine” in M. J. Tarr and H. H. Bülthoff (Eds.), Object 
Recognition in Man, Monkey and Machine, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1998, pp. 1-20. 
[8] S. M. Koller, D. Hardmeier, S. Michel, and A. Schwaninger, 
“Investigating training and transfer effects resulting from recurrent CBT 
of X-ray image interpretation” in D. S. McNamara and J. G. Trafton 
(Eds.), Proceedings of the 29th Annual Cognitive Science Society, 
Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society, 2007, pp. 1181-1186. 
[9] S. M. Koller, D. Hardmeier, S. Michel, and A. Schwaninger,  
“Investigating training, transfer, and viewpoint effects resulting from 
recurrent CBT of X-ray image interpretation,” Journal of Transportation 
Security, vol. 1(2), 2008, pp. 1-21. 
[10] J. S. McCarley, A. F. Kramer, C. D. Wickens, E. D. Vidoni, and W. R. 
Boot. “Visual skills in airport-security screening,” Psychological 
Science, vol. 15(5), 2004, pp. 302-306. 
[11] S. Michel, C. J. de Ruiter, M. A. Hogervorst, S. M. Koller, R. Moerland 
and A. Schwaninger, “Computer-based training increases efficiency in 
X-ray image interpretation by aviation security screeners,” IEEE ICCST 
Proceedings, vol. 41, 2007, pp. 201-206. 
[12] A. Schwaninger, F. Hofer, and O. E. Wetter “Adaptive computer-based 
training increases on the job performance of X-ray screeners,” IEEE 
ICCST Proceedings, vol. 41, 2007, pp. 117-124. 
[13] A. Schwaninger, A. Bolfing, T. Halbherr, S. Helman, A. Belyavin, and 
L. Hay, “The impact of image based factors and training on threat 
detection performance,” Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference 
on Research in Air Transportation (ICRAT), 2008, pp. 317-324. 
[14] K. Catchpole, J. Fletcher, A. McClumpha, A. Miles, and A. Zar, “Threat 
image projection: applied signal detection for aviation security” in D. 
Harris (Ed.), Engineering Psychology and Cognitive Ergonomics, vol. 6, 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, pp. 231-237. 
[15] F. Hofer and A. Schwaninger, “Using threat image projection data for 
assessing individual screener performance,” WIT Transactions on the 
Built Environment, vol. 82, 2005, pp. 417-426. 
[16] R. C. Carter, “Visual search with colour,” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, vol. 8(1), 1982, pp. 
127-136. 
[17] B. F. Green and L. K. Anderson, “Color coding in a visual search task,” 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, vol. 51(1), 1956, pp. 19-24. 
[18] K. Nakayama and G. H. Silverman, “Serial and parallel processing of 
visual feature conjunctions,” Nature, vol. 320(6059), 1986, pp.  264-265. 
[19] S. L. Smith, “Color coding and visual search,” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, vol. 64(5), 1962, pp. 434-440. 
[20] J. Duncan and G. W. Humphreys, “Visual search and stimulus 
similarity,” Psychological Review, vol. 96(3), 1989, pp. 433-458. 
[21] A. M. Treisman and G. Gelade, “A feature-integration theory of 
attention,” Cognitive Psychology, vol. 12, 1980, pp. 97-136. 
[22] J. M. Wolfe, “Guided Search 4.0: Current progress with a model of 
visual search,” in W. Gray (Ed.), Integrated Models of Cognitive 
Systems, New York: Oxford, 2007, pp. 99-119. 
[23] S. M. Koller and A. Schwaninger, “Assessing X-ray image interpretation 
competency of airport security screeners,” Proceedings of the 2nd 
International Conference on Research in Air Transportation (ICRAT), 
2006, pp. 399-402. 
[24] D. Hardmeier and A. Schwaninger, “Visual cognition abilities in X-ray 
screening,” Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Research 
in Air Transportation (ICRAT), 2008, pp. 311-316. 
[25] J. B. Grier, “Nonparametric indexes for sensitivity and bias: Computing 
formulas,” Psychological Bulletin, vol. 75, 1971, pp. 424-429. 
[26] R. E. Pastore, E. J. Crawley, M. S. Berens, and M. A. Skelly, 
“’Nonparametric’ A' and other modern misconceptions about signal 
detection theory,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, vol. 10, 2003, pp. 
556-569. 
[27] A. Bolfing and A. Schwaninger, Measurement formulae for image-based 
factors in X-ray imagery, 2007, retrieved July 31, 2009 from CASRA 
Web site: http://www.casra.ch/publications/doc/BolSch2007.pdf 
[28] S. E. Palmer, E. Rosch, and P. Chase, “Canonical perspective and the 
perception of objects,” in I. Long and A. Baddeley (Eds.), Attention and 
Performance IX, Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1981. 
[29] J. Cohen, “A power primer,” Psychological Bulletin, vol. 112(1), 1992, 
pp. 155-159. 
205
Authorized licensed use limited to: MAIN LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH. Downloaded on November 18, 2009 at 13:59 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
